Definitions and intent
By 'screening' in the context of this discussion, I understand "any procedures undertaken in order to detect presymptomatic disease in a population".' Genetic screening I treat as a means to furthering "the main purpose of medical genetics (which) is to apply the principles of genetics to the practice of medicine so that the burden of genetic disorders can be reduced in the community".2 I observe the common agreement here to limit the discussion of screening to patients for whom there are already indications of risk.
The relevant moral reasoning requires the holding in tension of a cluster of principles, each exerting moral claims. I reduce these to three. I shall then relate cases to them.
A.1. The tension between human liberty and responsibility within nature and biological processes
In the glib language of today's pseudo-piety, medical scientists are alleged to 'play God'. If this *Text of a paper presented at the King's Fund Forum 'Consensus and controversy in medicine: screening for fetal and genetic abnormality '. 30) November to 2 December 1987. Received for publication 23 December 1987 . Accepted for publication 4 January 1988. is meant to imply that only God, as the Creator of nature, may manipulate it, the slogan is absurd. It has no foundation either in theology or in human experience. Theology, with its language of man made in the image of this Creator God, attributes responsibility to man: a limited dominion, within the created order. Millenia of human experience, from animal husbandry and agriculture to medical practice, has recognised human intervention as a timeless and universal human activity proper to the nature of man. God is neither jealous nor mocked.
Nature is neither divine, perfect, nor immutable. In the realms of human biology its products from time to time are marred. A combination of scientific disciplines now yields, first, some understanding of how these mishaps occur; secondly, means of detecting some of them prenatally, at ever earlier stages of development; and, thirdly, means to remedy or palliate some few of those detected. It would be hard to establish a reasoned moral case forbidding the exercise, in this field, of normal human faculties to protect human kind from the random adversities of nature. Medical genetics shares with most medical practice the primary obligation to each patient, one by one: to a person, in strict terms the bearer of rights, and more generally the embodiment of interests to be enhanced and enjoyed. The patient is also a member of a body corporate, a human society in its various cellular structures: blood group, family, kindred, nation, race, and so on. As a social morality grows out of a tension between personal interests and corporate or social interests, so an ethics of medical genetics has to take account of the social consequences of accumulated clinical decisions made primarily in the interest of individual patients. In an ethically harmonious society, and when scientific development is slow enough to carry within it a general understanding and acceptance, that tension between the personal and the corporate wills resolves itself in conventions, norms of conduct, professionally and socially accepted. When these two conditions, ethical homogeneity and a manageable tempo, are lacking, as they are today, conflict is Equally the power inherent in medical genetics must be preserved from abuse in trivial causes. People speak of 'the camel's nose'. The threat is not only that our concept of the tolerable in handicap might diminish to the point where our humanity is diminished with it, it is also that the human will might intrude too far, to aborting a child of the unwanted sex, for instance, without the justification of a sex linked disorder. The responsibility of genetic counsellors is serious here. The price of liberty must be self-restraint from the frivolous and the bizarre.
B.2.
What has just been said about the use of our liberty within the natural process has sharper definition in relation to our responsibility for human life. This is not an occasion to rehearse the old abortion debate. We work, anyhow, on the fringe of that problem: only a small percentage of terminations are registered on the ground of fetal handicap.
The leading fact is that nature itself discards spontaneously some of its defective products. Unfortunately, being as uncertain in its calculations as we are, if not more so, it does not discard them all. Neither is there, beyond a certain point, any exemplary scale in what it discards: some of those which it spares are among the most gravely handicapped. Furthermore (except in conditions fatal before puberty) nature seems not to check the descent of defective genes from generation to generation, which is one of the goals (with recognised limitations) of medical genetics. The question then follows: if genetic screening with selective abortion is in fact a rationalised adjunct to natural processes, are there ethical controls to guide it?
It seems to me that once we repudiate (as I must) the absolutist prohibition on abortion, the ethics must be wrought in a continual tension between a general presumption in favour of life and the strength of a claim to rebut it in any particular case. The claim must not be trivial if it is to prevail, and it should have respect to human life in its relational capacity as well as in its biological reality. The solution may well be worked out in a tension between the genetic counsellor and the potential parent, the one sharing something of a professional ethics in the matter, the other something of the wide spectrum of attitudes current in our society.
I suggest further that we only make the task harder if we pose the problem in the language of a conflict of rights. In hard fact, the fetus has no rights, as the law and hard reasoning understand rights, until it is born alive. And English law does not confer any general right to an abortion: the Statute of 1967 defined conditions in which the termination would not be a criminal act. Progress would look more promising, I believe, if within the concept of a duty owed to the unborn child by both parent and physician-for duties can stand without the supposition of rights-the ethics are sought in a weighing of interests, those of the unborn child and those of the mother, and a consideration of how these interests are to be served, whether together or one at the expense of the other. One interest clearly to be served by genetic screening is that of a potential mother in an assurance, if it can be given, that her next child should be normal.
C.2.
We pass finally to the tension between individual persons, whether physicians or patients, and the society of which both are members.
The sciences of medical genetics and gene tracking now carry the study out into the patient's family, whose cooperation has to be won. Here again the language of rights will prove unhelpful. Human wills are involved, and they have to be wooed and won to serve the relevant interests. However, the search requires the sharing of knowledge gained in a clinical relationship, and here we meet the old questions: How much must be kept secret? How The language of rights is useless again. We are left with an obligation, first to establish trust between the patient and the medical geneticist, and confidence in the operation, and then to seek for willed consent to such disclosure as, step by step, will aid the serving of all the interests involved, personal and social, as they emerge.
Fundamental to medical practice, and especially to medical genetics, is what we call truth. The more the study moves out from the individual subject to the family, the more important is the assumption that social identity-who we believe we arecoincides with genetic identity-who genetically we are. Uncertainty of parentage arising from human waywardness is morally irrelevant. If this be so, is it not time to call into question the insistence on anonymity for donors of gametes in the medical remedying of infertility? And to press for methods of registration which, while tolerant of acceptable fiction for those who want it, will enable fact to be disclosed to those who need it? If we believe in any coherence between rationality in science and moral rationality, not only medical disciplines in their complementarity, but also social policies in their consistency, should be grounded in what science professes to seek: truth. 
